Although there is evidence to suggest visual illusions affect perceptual judgments more than actions, many studies have failed to detect task-dependant dissociations. In two experiments we attempt to resolve the contradiction by exploring the time-course of visual illusion effects on both saccadic eye movements and perceptual judgments, using the Judd illusion. The results showed that, regardless of whether a saccadic response or a perceptual judgement was made, the illusory bias was larger when responses were based on less information, that is, when saccadic latencies were short, or display duration was brief. The time-course of the effect was similar for both the saccadic responses and perceptual judgements, suggesting that both modes may be driven by a shared visual representation. Changes in the strength of the illusion over time also highlight the importance of controlling for the latency of different response systems when evaluating possible dissociations between them.
Introduction
Processes involved in recognition and identification of objects rely on different parts of visual cortex than processes that assist localization and grasping of objects. This is uncontroversial. What is controversial is the idea is that these different processes are driven by independent pathways and separate visual representations (e.g., Goodale & Milner, 1992; Milner & Goodale, 1993 . Neurophysiological and neuropsychological evidence supports the idea that visually-guided actions can be dissociated from conscious report (e.g., Goodale & Milner, 1992) . While this finding suggests that separate representations drive perception and action, several studies have questioned the existence of a clear separation (Bruno & Franz, 2009; de Grave, Smeets, & Brenner, 2006; Franz, Fahle, Bulthoff, & Gegenfurtner, 2001; Franz, Gegenfurtner, Bulthoff, & Fahle, 2000; Glover, 2002; Knox & Bruno, 2007; Vishton et al., 2007) . Here we will focus on evidence that visual representation changes as a function of time, such that when in time visual information is used significantly influences human behavior (e.g., Donk & van Zoest, 2009; Hunt, von Mühlenen, & Kingstone, 2007; van Zoest, Donk, & Theeuwes, 2004) . Little is known about how perception and action are affected by processing dynamics in visual representations. Instead of two separate representations driving behavior, it may be that behavior is controlled by one common visual representation that changes as a function of time . When response decisions occur at different moments in time, they may be based on different time points in this emerging representation of objects, their identities, their task relevance, and their spatial relationships. The present study aims to investigate processing dynamics in a visual illusion, as measured by saccadic eye movements and perceptual judgments.
Representations for perception and action
Support for separate processing streams for perception and action is found in the primate visual system (e.g., Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982) . Under this model, the ventral stream runs from occipital to temporal cortex and is responsible for the perception and identification of objects. The dorsal stream runs from occipital to parietal cortex and is responsible for motor control and actions towards objects. Further evidence in favor of the dual-route hypothesis -the idea that these are indeed separate and independent processing streams -was found in studies of neuropsychological patients (Goodale & Milner, 1992; Goodale, Milner, Jakobson, & Carey, 1991; Milner & Goodale, 1995) . Patients with damage to the ventral stream have difficulties identifying and recognizing objects, yet these patients are unimpaired in their motor abilities towards the same objects. In contrast, patients with damage to the dorsal stream show no difficulties in object-identification, but show impaired abilities in grasping and reaching. These two 0042-6989/$ -see front matter Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.visres.2010.10.013 classes of patients together constitute a double dissociation between the recognition of common objects and the ability to use information about the size, shape and orientation of an object to control the hand and fingers during a grasping movement. These results suggest that distinct visual representations underlie perception and action.
Supporting evidence for the dual-route hypothesis has also come from research showing that visual illusions affect perception more than action (Aglioti, DeSouza, & Goodale, 1995; Bridgeman, Lewis, Heit, & Nagle, 1979; Westwood & Goodale, 2003) . For example, Aglioti et al. (1995) used a variation of the Titchener illusion to investigate the effect of the illusion on perception and action. When participants were presented with two disks of equal size, they perceived a disk surrounded by smaller circles as larger than a disk surrounded by larger circles. However, when participants were asked to pick up one of the disks, grip size was similar for the two disks. Aglioti et al. concluded that processing in the ventral stream was susceptible to the visual illusion while processing in the dorsal stream was not, or much less. Because contextual information plays an important role in perceptual processes, they are susceptible to context-based visual illusions. In contrast, the visuomotor system encodes information with respect to the appropriate egocentric reference frame for a given action and does not require a high-level perceptual representation that contains contextual information about the object. As a result, it was argued, visuomotor processing in the dorsal stream is better able to resist visual illusions. These findings not only support the idea that perception and action are served by distinct spatial representations, but also imply that the action representations exist outside of conscious visual experience.
However, as briefly noted before, some have questioned the idea of strong separate representations in the dual-route model (Clark, 2009; Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008; Franz et al., 2000 Franz et al., , 2001 Glover, 2002; Glover & Dixon, 2001; Smeets & Brenner, 1995 . This reservation is driven by a number of studies showing that motor behavior is affected by visual illusions (e.g., de Grave, Franz, & Gegenfurtner, 2006; Glover & Dixon, 2001 ; these results suggest that some aspects of motor control such as velocity of reach and grip forces are not resistant to the effects of visual illusions (Jackson & Shaw, 2000; Smeets & Brenner, 1995) . Interactions between perception and action processes have also posed challenges to the idea of separate streams. For instance, dorsal stream processing contributes to object categorization (Almeida, Mahon, & Caramazza, 2010) , and manipulation of objects can improve identification in agnosics (Schenk & Milner, 2006) . Demonstrations of mutual interference and facilitation between perception and action tasks are the basis for the influential common-coding theory of perception (Hommel, Musseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Prinz, 1997) which has at its core the idea that visual and motor representations overlap. Representations for perception and action may thus not be as independent as initially assumed; some properties may be shared between the representations such that interactions are possible (Goodale & Westwood, 2004) , or perhaps a single, shared representation drives perception and action (e.g., Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008; Franz, Scharnowski, & Gegenfurtner, 2005; Franz et al., 2000 Franz et al., , 2001 Mon-Williams & Bull, 2000; Smeets & Brenner, 1995; Smeets, Brenner, de Grave, & Cuijpers, 2002) .
Eye movements and visual illusions
Additional insight into how actions are affected by visual illusions is provided by studies on eye movements and illusions (Binsted & Elliott, 1999; de Grave, Franz et al., 2006;  Kramer, & DiGirolamo, 2003) . Unlike reaching and grasping, eye movements can be elicited much earlier in time and providing a unique window in early visual processing. Indeed, the eye movement system would seem to provide conditions most likely to confirm the dual-route hypothesis, given that the retinotectal visual pathway enables eye movements to be executed in the absence of any cortical visual processing (Schiller, 1977) . Nevertheless, similar to results with manual movement responses described above, results from studies on oculomotor behavior are inconsistent. Some have found that oculomotor programming is resistant to visual illusions (Wong & Mack, 1981) while others have found it is not (Bernardis, Knox, & Bruno, 2005; de Grave, Franz et al., 2006; de Grave, Smeets et al., 2006; Knox & Bruno, 2007; McCarley et al., 2003) .
One way to explain the inconsistent effects of illusions on oculomotor behavior was put forward by McCarley et al. (2003) . They suggested that differences in saccadic control might account for differences in effect size of the illusion on saccadic performance (see also, DiGirolamo et al., 2008) . Specifically, stimulus-driven reflexive eye movements may be differently influenced by a visual illusion than goal-driven voluntary controlled eye movements. McCarley et al. (2003) asked participants to saccade to the endpoint of a Müller-Lyer illusion stimulus. Saccades were controlled either reflexively, by a transient go-signal that was presented at the endpoint of the stimuli, or voluntarily, by a spoken go-signal. The results showed that the effect of the illusion was larger for voluntary than for reflexive movements. In this study, voluntary saccades showed effects of the illusion similar in magnitude to those evident in perceptual judgments. The results are explained by the idea that reflexive and voluntary saccades are controlled by different representations. Reflexive saccades rely on automatic collicular programs that are based on low-level retinotopic representations. These low-level representations are not susceptible to context and hence are not influenced by the illusion. Voluntary saccades, it was argued, occur within a reference frame that is more similar to conscious visual perception, and therefore do take into account high-level contextual information and are influenced by visual illusions. Given that an effect of the visual illusion was obtained for voluntary saccades, which can certainly be categorized as visually-guided actions, the results of McCarley et al. (2003) do not agree with the idea of strong independent representations. The results of McCarley et al. (2003) may be reconciled with a weaker version of the dual-route hypothesis where the representations are not completely independent but allow for some interactions (Goodale & Westwood, 2004) .
Nevertheless, the discussion is complicated by a second study in which the effect of a visual illusion on reflexive and voluntary saccades was investigated. In this work, Knox and Bruno (2007) reported the opposite pattern to McCarley et al. (2003) . Knox and Bruno found an effect of the illusion on reflexive saccades that was comparable to that usually observed in verbal perceptual tasks; a much smaller effect of the illusion was found for voluntary saccades. Methodological differences may explain some of the inconsistencies between this result and McCarley et al.'s finding. For instance, instead of using a transient abrupt onset to trigger the reflexive saccade, Knox and Bruno (2007) used fixation offset to facilitate the execution of fast reflexive saccades. Another difference is that McCarley et al. used a verbal spoken go-signal to elicit voluntary movements, while in Knox and Bruno's experiment participants were required to saccade to the remembered endpoint of the illusion-inducing stimulus in the voluntary saccade condition.
Although methodological details like those above may partly explain why effects of illusions are found on some behaviors but not others (Bruno & Franz, 2009; Knox & Bruno, 2007) , differences in timing between different conditions and tasks makes further comparisons between studies difficult. The moment in time at which a response is elicited can greatly influence performance (e.g., Hunt et al., 2007 Hunt et al., , 2010 . Visual representations are not static but change as a function of time and the kind of information that guides behavior may depend on when in time the representation is accessed (Donk & van Zoest, 2008; Hunt et al., 2007; van Zoest et al., 2004) . Therefore, short-latency responses are based on different information than long-latency responses and this may affect performance in visual illusions. For instance, the effects of saliency of elements in a visual array have been found exclusively for shortlatency responses (Donk & van Zoest, 2008; van Zoest & Donk, 2005; van Zoest et al., 2004) . In contrast, responses elicited later in time are not affected by saliency, but are primarily controlled by task set and intentions (van Zoest & Donk, 2006 . In the case of visual illusions, perceptual judgments of illusions based on a rapid initial representation could include the gist of an image and global context (e.g., Oliva & Torralba, 2006) , while later processing may be guided by control mechanisms that are better able to filter out irrelevant contextual information (e.g., Glover, 2002) . This would lead to a diminished effect of the illusion over time. In contrast, if visually-guided actions are based on a separate representation, earlier responses may be driven by more purely motor processing within the dorsal stream, while actions executed later in time would incorporate a broader representation that includes information about context and object identity. This would lead to an increase in the effect of illusions on action over time.
The current study will investigate the time-course of responses to a visual illusion. Responses that are based on less information are expected to be differentially influenced by the illusion than responses that are based on more information. Time-course differences may help to clarify differences between the effect of illusions for reflexive and voluntary eye movements (Knox & Bruno, 2007; McCarley et al., 2003) and may help to explain discrepancies in results from other response systems as well (e.g., Aglioti et al., 1995; de Grave, Smeets et al., 2006; Glover & Dixon, 2001) . Additionally, comparison of perceptual and motor responses to visual illusions over time can shed light on the degree to which they are based on a shared representation. If perception and action share a dynamic representation, representational change will affect performance in both modalities similarly, producing a similar time-course of the effects across both tasks. To test this prediction, participants were presented with the Judd illusion (Judd, 1899) , and the time-course of the effect of visual illusion on visual-guided eye movements (Experiment 1) and perceptual judgments (Experiment 2) was investigated.
Experiment 1
Participants were instructed to make an eye movement to the middle of a line presented in the periphery. The line's ends were capped by arrow heads pointing left, right, inward, or outward. A bisection bias away from the direction of the arrows is predicted to occur when the two arrowheads point in the same direction (see Fig 1C) . This misperception can be explained by a propensity of the visual system to perceive the center of the whole object rather than the center of a component within the image of the object (e.g., Mon-Williams & Bull, 2000; Ro & Rafal, 1996) . No bias is expected when the arrowheads both point inward or outward. Time-course analysis will reveal whether and how the bias changes as a function of latency.
Method

Participants
Twelve students from the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam participated in Experiment 1 in exchange for course credit or money. Participants ranged in age from 19 to 28 (mean age 21.2). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Apparatus
A Pentium IV computer with a processor speed of 2.3 GHz controlled the timing of the events. Displays were presented on an Iiyama 21 00 SVGA monitor with a resolution of 1024 Â 768 pixels and a 100-Hz refresh rate. Eye movements were recorded by means of an Eyelink II tracker (SR Research Ltd.) with a 500 Hz temporal resolution and a 0.2°of visual angle spatial resolution. The system uses an infrared video-based tracking technology to compute the pupil center and pupil size of both eyes. Saccades were identified by means of a velocity threshold (35 deg/s) and an acceleration threshold (9500 deg/s 2
). All subjects were tested in a sound-attenuated, dimly lit room with their heads resting on a chinrest. The monitor was located at eye level 75 cm from the chinrest.
Stimuli
There were eight different types of line stimuli. Of these eight, the arrow heads pointed in the same direction in four stimuli ( Fig. 1A ). Of these, arrows positioned horizontally pointed either left or right, and arrows positioned vertically pointed either up or down. In the four remaining line types the arrow heads pointed in opposite directions and these stimuli acted as control stimuli (Fig. 1B) . Two control stimuli were oriented horizontally and two were oriented vertically. The shaft of the stimuli extended 8.12 degree of visual angle (DVA). The inclination of the wings with respect to the shaft was 45°, and the length of the wings was 1.94 DVA. The horizontal stimuli appeared either above or below the fixation point, while the vertical stimuli appeared either the left or to the right of the fixation point. The stimuli were presented at 9.09 DVA from fixation, and with a random jitter of plus or minus 0, 0.3 or 0.6 DVA.
The eight stimuli were grouped in two conditions based on the expected effect of the illusion. The bias was measured in distance from the actual middle of the line and was expressed in DVA. The experimental condition consisted of four arrow types and these either pointed left, right, up, or down (see Fig. 1A ). It was predicted that the eye movements directed to the middle of the line would be biased to the mid-position of the figure. The control condition was composed of the four symmetric stimuli (see Fig. 1B ). Eye movements to the middle of the line in the control stimulus should not significantly deviate from the actual middle of the stimulus.
Design and procedure
Participants first viewed a calibration display consisting of nine points in a square array, which were fixated sequentially. The eyetracking system was calibrated at the start of each block. In order to start each trial participants maintained fixation on a central dot. Participants then pressed the spacebar in order to apply a drift correction and to begin the trial with the presentation of a small fixation point for 500 ms followed by the bisection stimulus. To elicit a large range of saccadic latencies, the fixation point was removed at three different stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) of: À200, 0 and 200 relative to the target onset. Participants were instructed to make a saccade as quickly as possible following the offset of the fixation point. It is known that saccadic latencies become progressively faster when the fixation point is removed before the saccade target is presented and become slower when it is removed following presentation of the saccadic target (Kingstone & Klein, 1993; Saslow, 1967) . This manipulation was expected to yield short-latency as well high long-latency saccades. Participants were instructed to make an eye movement to the middle of the shaft of the stimulus. The stimulus was presented for 1000 ms after a saccade had ended, or for a total of 2000 ms.
Participants were given written and oral instruction prior to the beginning of the experiment. They completed 32 practice trials and 504 experimental trials. Bisection stimuli (8) were randomly varied within blocks of trials. Participants received feedback regarding saccadic latency following every 25 trials and took a break after a block of 168 trials.
Results
Saccade latencies above 800 ms (3.39% of all trials) were counted as errors and were excluded from analysis. Saccade latency shorter than 80 ms (0.22% of all trials) were regarded as anticipatory responses and were not included in further analysis. Eye movements that landed further than 3 DVA from the stimuli (5.09% of all trials) where regarded as having missed the target and were not analyzed further.
Only the first saccade was analyzed. To check whether the SOA manipulation helped to generate short and long saccade latencies, a repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on initial saccade latency with condition (directional arrows and control arrows) and SOA (À200, 0, 200) as within-subject factors. The main effect of condition was significant F(1, 11) = 6.78, p = 0.0025. The mean saccade latency to directional arrows was a little bit slower (mean 221.9 ms) than the control arrows (219.9 ms). Importantly the main effect of SOA was highly significant, F(1, 11) = 245.49, p < 0.0001 and revealed that saccadic latencies increased with an increasing overlap between fixation point and display onset. Mean saccadic latency was 167.5 ms in the À200, 168.2 ms in the 0 ms condition and 327.1 ms in the 200 ms overlap condition. The interaction between condition and SOA was not significant, F(2, 22) < 1.
To create the overall time-course of the effect, for each of the 12 participants, trials were categorized per condition and sorted based on saccade latency (collapsed over SOA manipulation) and divided in three equal bins (tertiles). Mean latencies for the three bins were 142.6 ms for the first bin, 187.3 ms for the second and 339.7 ms for the third bin. The average distance to the center of the shaft (i.e., bias) was calculated for each condition (2) and tertile (3) of the sorted distribution of saccadic latencies. Mean saccadic latency was calculated per condition per tertile.
From Fig. 2 it is clear the illusion is biasing the saccade bisection point, and, moreover, the bias in the illusion is greater earlier rather than later in time. These observations were tested in an AN-OVA with condition (directional arrows and control arrows) and tertile (3) as within-subject factors and distance to the center in DVA as the dependent variable. The main effect of tertile was significant, F(2, 22) = 6.50, p = 0.006. The main effect of condition was significant, F(1, 11) = 19.20, p = 0.0011, as was the interaction between condition and tertile, F(2, 22) = 9.40, p = 0.0011. Planned linear contrasts revealed that the bias significantly decreased as a function of tertile in the directional arrows condition, F(1, 11) = 55.24, p < 0.0001, but not in the control arrows condition, F(1, 11) < 1. These tests confirm that saccadic eye movements were significantly influenced by the illusion and this bias decreased with an increase in saccade latency.
To check whether it was the saccadic latencies per se that decreased the illusion-induced bias or if it was instead the fixation manipulation that interacted with bias, we also ran the ANOVA on the bias measure with condition (directional arrows and control arrows) and SOA (3) as factors. There was a significant main effect of condition, F(1, 11) = 18.17, p = 0.0013, as well as a main effect of SOA, F (2, 22) = 11.56, p < 0.0001. However, in contrast with the ANOVA with condition and tertile as factors, the interaction between condition and SOA was not significant, F(2, 22) = 2.18, p = 0.14. This pattern of results suggests that it was saccade latency, and not fixation offset time, that influences saccade bias.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 revealed that saccades intended to be directed to the center of the line were biased away from the actual center by the arrowheads. Time-course analyses further revealed that the bias decreased as a function of saccadic latency. The later in time the eyes left the fixation point, the smaller the effect of the illusion.
Given that an effect of the visual illusion was obtained for visually-guided actions (saccades) the results of Experiment 1 do not agree with the idea of strong independent representations for perception and action. According to the idea that independent representations guide perception and action, saccadic eye movements were expected to be resistant to the effect of the visual illusion. These results are in line with other studies that have demonstrated that eye movements are susceptible to visual illusions (e.g., de Grave, Franz et al., 2006; de Grave, Smeets et al., 2006) . The existence of strong illusion effects that diminish over time also argues against the idea that faster, more reflexive responses are refractory to illusions while slower, more voluntary responses incorporate ventral stream processes and are therefore more likely to be susceptible to visual illusions (McCarley et al., 2003) . If that were the case, effects of illusions should grow, rather than diminish, over time, as ventral stream processes would have more opportunity to influence responses executed later.
The results of Experiment 1 may be best interpreted in line with the planning-control model by Glover and colleagues (Glover, 2002 (Glover, , 2004 Glover & Dixon, 2001 . According to this model, actions consist of a planning stage and a control stage where each stage uses its own representation. Whereas the visual representation used in planning incorporates the visual context surrounding the target, the representation used in control operates relatively independent of context. As a consequence of the role of context in the two representations, planning is affected by visual illusions, whereas on-line control is not. Evidence for this model is provided by studies in which the effects of the illusion on grasping at a range of points throughout the reach were measured, rather than at the point of the maximum grip aperture only (Glover & Dixon, 2001 . The results showed that the effect of illusion was large early in the reach and decreased as the hand approached the target. The results of Glover and Dixon suggest that the effects of a visual illusion on action are dynamic (however, see Franz et al., 2005; Meegan et al., 2004) .
The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with the idea of a later control stage that corrects for early misperceptions that occur in a planning stage. However, the dynamic effects of illusions may not be limited to motor responses. Effects of the illusion may similarly be dynamic in perception. The idea here is that behavior -perception and action alike -is driven by one shared representation that develops over time. If the effects of visual illusion are ultimately guided by one representation, similar time-course differences should become apparent if one looks at the time-course of perceptual responses. Similar to the saccadic responses in Experiment 1, responses driven by less information may be more biased by the illusion than responses driven by more information.
Experiment 2
A staircase procedure (e.g., Bertelson & Aschersleben, 1998 ) was employed to investigate how perceptual responses are affected by the visual illusion. To investigate the time-course of the effect of the illusion in perception, the duration of the arrow stimuli varied. Participants judged the position of a small line segment crossing the shaft of the arrow relative to the perceived center of the arrow shaft. The line segment was initially placed at a large distance from the middle of the arrow shaft, either to the left or right for the horizontally oriented stimuli, or above or below the center for the vertically oriented stimuli. During the experiment, the placement of the line segment on the bisection stimulus was contingent on the response of the participant on the previous trial on the same staircase. For example, if a participant reported the line element as positioned to the right of the center of the bisection stimulus in one staircase, the line element moved one step to the left on the next trial when the same staircase was presented. Consecutive ''right" responses will move the line element progressively closer to the center of the stimulus. When the line is perceived to cross the center, the response will reverse and the participant will respond ''left". These responses reversals are therefore taken as an estimate of the perceived center of the stimulus.
It is predicted that response reversals will be biased away from the center in the illusion stimuli compared to the control stimuli. In order to investigate the time-course of the effect of the illusion, we manipulated the presentation duration. If the increase in saccade accuracy occurs because of changes to the representation of the stimulus over time, the effect of the illusion on perceptual judgments should also decrease as stimulus-presentation duration increases. In other words, observers are expected to be better able to correct for initial misperception when responses are based on more information.
Method
Participants
Twelve paid volunteers participated in Experiment 2. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Apparatus
The experiment was run on an HP Compaq with a 2.6-GHz Pentium 4 processor and 512 MB of RAM. The stimuli were presented on a 19-in. Iiyama Vision Master Pro 454 CRT screen with a refresh rate of 120 Hz and a resolution of 1024 Â 768 pixels. Viewing distance was at 68 cm. Participants responded using the keys, 2, 4, 8 and 6 on the number pad on the keyboard.
Stimuli
The stimuli were identical to the stimuli used in Experiment 1, except that a small-superimposed line segment was presented at varying locations along the shaft of the arrow stimuli (0.85 DVA). In Experiment 2 the shaft of the stimuli extended 7.95 DVA and the length of the wings was 1.85 DVA. The stimuli were presented at 8.78 DVA from fixation, with a random jitter of 0, 0.29 or 0.59 DVA. Also a mask, extending across the entire display and composed of crosshatched lines, immediately followed presentation of the target stimulus. See Fig. 3. 
Procedure
The directional arrows in the experimental condition were separated based on the expected bias in unreferenced DVA relative to the middle of the line. For the horizontal arrows, left from the middle was negative and right from the middle positive. For the vertical arrows, up from the middle was negative and below from the middle positive. In turn, the predicted bias is a positive deviation in DVA from the middle for both the left and up pointing arrows: Observers are expected to perceive the middle as being to the right of the actual center in left pointing arrows and down from the actual center in up pointing arrows. The expected bias is a negative deviation from the actual center for the right and down pointing arrows: Observers are expected to perceive the middle as being left from the actual center in right pointing arrows and up from the actual center in down pointing arrows. This distinction resulted in a total of three stimulus conditions, the control arrow condition, and two experimental conditions (left and up pointing arrows and right and down pointing arrows).
Eighteen staircases resulted from the combination of three stimulus conditions (control, arrow left and up, arrow right and down), three presentation durations (100, 200 and 400 ms), and two staircase start positions (left/above the center, right/below the center). Trials from each of the 18 staircases were randomly intermingled. The start positions of the line segments were 40 pixels (1.21 DVA) out from the center of the bitmap of the arrow. These presentation durations were picked to resemble short, medium and long-latency responses in the saccadic bisection task. The task of the participants in Experiment 2 was to indicate, using the number pad on the keyboard, whether the small line was positioned to the left or right of the center of the horizontal stimuli or above or below the center of the vertical stimuli. If they observed the line as being positioned to the left or right of the center, they pressed the '4' or '6' key, respectively. If the line was positioned above or below the center of the vertical stimuli, they pressed '8' or '2' key, respectively. The position of the line element depended on the response given to that same staircase in a previous trial: the line was always shifted 2 pixels in the opposite direction of the response on the previous trial. A reversal is defined as a response different from the preceding one on the same staircase. A given staircase would be considered completed and would no longer be presented to an observer when 10 reversals had been recorded.
A trial started with the presentation of a fixation point for 500 ms and was followed by the presentation of the bisection stimulus. This stimulus was presented for 100, 200 or 400 ms and was followed by a mask. Once a key response was recorded, the mask was presented for another 1000 ms. Completion of 10 reversals in each of the 18 staircases took on average 770 trials, taking participants around 45 min to finish. Prior to the experimental session, participants received written instructions and completed 48 practice trials.
Results
Fig . 4 displays the results of the 18 staircases separately for each condition. The results show that the left and right staircases converge as the number of reversals increases. Critically, the mean staircases of the three conditions converge at different locations relative to the actual center of the stimulus: The left and up arrow condition converge at a location biased positively from the actual center. Conversion in the control condition occurs close to the actual center. The right and down arrow condition converge at a location biased negatively from the center of the stimulus.
The analysis of the data was based on the average over the last five reversals, averaged over the left and the right staircase. Similar to Experiment 1, the data was analyzed based on the 'expected bias' from the center of the line as dependent variable. The data was collapsed over the left and up and right and down arrows, resulting in two main conditions involving the (1) directional arrows and (2) control arrows. The distance from center is positive when the eyes are biased in the expected direction and negative when they are biased in the unexpected direction.
These averages are illustrated in Fig. 5 , in which it is clear that the bias decreases with an increase in presentation duration. In order to statistically test these observations, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with condition (directional arrows and control arrows) and presentation duration (100, 200 and 400 ms) as within-subject factors. The main effect of presentation duration was significant, F(2, 22) = 8.34, p = 0.0020; the main effect of condition was significant, F(1, 11) = 121.74, p < 0.0001, as well as the interaction between condition and presentation duration, 100, 200, 400 ms 500 ms F(2, 22) = 11.77, p < 0.0001. Planned linear contrasts revealed that the bias significantly decreased as a function of presentation duration in the experimental condition, F(1, 11) = 57.60, p < 0.0001, but not in the control arrow condition, F(1, 11) < 1. These tests confirm that the perceptual responses were significantly influenced by the illusion and this bias significantly decreased as presentation duration increases.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 demonstrated that perceptual responses are subject to the dynamic influences of the visual illusion. The bias in the perceptual judgment of center was smaller when display duration was long rather than short. In other words, perception seemed to partly overcome the effects of the arrowheads when more information was available.
General discussion
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the timecourse of responses to a visual illusion. Perceptual representations develop over time, and therefore short-latency responses are based on different information than long-latency responses van Zoest et al., 2010) . The results of Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that the effect of the arrow head direction is dynamic and decreases over time, regardless of whether a visually-guided saccade or a perceptual judgment was made. Our results suggest that a shared representation that develops over time drives both perception and action. The early form of the representation appears to be driven by the global gist of the display, and it is influenced by misleading contextual information. As time passes the representation changes and becomes more sophisticated as irrelevant information is discarded and other information, such as prior knowledge and observer goals, is integrated. Thus, when observers are slower and more time has been allowed for visual processing, performance is guided by higher-order knowledge, allowing observers to filter out irrelevant contextual information.
There are at least two reasons why the present results do not agree with the idea of strong independent representations for perception and action as proposed by the dual-route hypothesis (Goodale & Milner, 1992) . First, an effect of the visual illusion was obtained for visually-guided saccades in Experiment 1. Saccadic eye movements are a motor response and have been argued to rely most strongly on a dorsal processing. According to the dual-route hypothesis, motor programming should be more or less resistant to illusions (e.g., Aglioti et al., 1995) . Second, the effect of the illusion was seen to decrease as a function of processing time in both Experiments 1 and 2. Finding a similar response pattern across different response modalities suggests that both perception and action are based on a single visual representation.
The idea that perception and action may be driven by a single representation is not new (e.g., Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008; Franz et al., 2000 Franz et al., , 2001 Franz et al., , 2005 Mon-Williams & Bull, 2000; Smeets & Brenner, 1995; Smeets et al., 2002) . While previous studies have emphasized the importance of adequately matching the taskrequirements if performance between two tasks is compared, the present work stresses the importance of taking the passage of time into account. To the extent that different tasks and responses depend on different kinds of information, they will be influenced differently by changes in the stimulus representation. The emerging representation of stimuli over time, therefore, can have different effects depending on both the type of response, and the time at which the response is executed van Zoest et al., 2010) . Previous results may have found differences between action and perception because they did not control for changes in the illusion effects over time.
The results of the current study are similar to results presented by Glover and colleagues (Glover, 2004; Glover & Dixon, 2001 in that they demonstrated that the effect of the visual illusion on action decreases over time. Based on their results, Glover and colleagues proposed the planning-control model of action. In this model, action is composed of a planning and control stage and each stage is served by distinct visual representations. Whereas the early planning stage is influenced by visual illusions, the later control stage is not. The data presented here, however, add to the planning-control model in one important way. In addition to finding dynamic effects of the illusion in action, the present data reveal the dynamic effect of the illusion in perception. Our data reveal that perceptual processes have, like action, an early stage that is susceptible to context and a later control stage that is not, or much less. Finding a similar response pattern in both visuomotor and perceptual responses suggests that these two response modalities may ultimately be driven by a single visual representation (Hunt et al., 2007 van Zoest et al., 2010) . With this respect, our interpretation deviates from the planningcontrol model, to suggest that, rather than separate representations guiding separate stages of action control, a single developing representation underlies changes in the influence of illusions over time.
A time-course approach may provide further insight when one considers differences in performance between reflexive and voluntary control in visual illusions (Knox & Bruno, 2007; McCarley et al., 2003) . Evidence suggest that reflexive control prevails during early selection, while voluntary control guides responses later in time (Theeuwes, Atchley, & Kramer, 2000; van Zoest et al., 2004) . In line with the findings that illusions have a greater effect early in time rather than later, it is predicted that illusions should have a greater influence in reflexive responses rather than voluntary responses. The results of Knox and Bruno (2007) are in line with this reasoning. Knox and Bruno found an effect of the illusion on reflexive saccades. A much smaller effect of the illusion was found for voluntary saccades. As with those results, our findings are difficult to reconcile with those of McCarley et al. (2003) , who found that reflexive (faster) saccades were less susceptible to the effects of arrowhead directions than voluntary ones. One important difference between our experiment and theirs is that here, saccades were directed towards the perceived center of a line, and so there was no point in space for the eye movement system to use as a target along the line itself. It may be that a luminance transient at a single point in space might provide special conditions where the eye movement system can execute movements without taking account of other visual information, particularly when successful acquisition of a visible target depends on ignoring contextual information.
An alternative explanation for the observed differences between fast responses and slow responses may be found in physiological and functional differences in the way information is processed by the visual system. There are two major pathways that carry the visual information from the retina to the lateral geniculate nucleus and onto cortical visual areas. Whereas the cells in the parvocellular pathways have a small receptive field and respond in a slow and sustained manner, cells in the magnocellular pathways have larger receptive fields and respond more in a fast and transient manner (Livingstone & Hubel, 1988; Maunsell, Nealey, & DePriest, 1990) . It may be the case that the quick and slow responses in the present study were differentially driven by magno and parvocellular processes respectively. Specifically, a large effect of the Judd illusion may be the result of fast processing by the magnocellular pathway that codes only low-spatial-frequency information and is not able to resolve the detail needed to accurately bisect the line. In contrast the smaller effects of the Judd illusion later in time may be the results of slower parvocellular processing that provides high-spatial-frequency information and is able to resolve the details. Evidence for the idea that visual illusions may be differentially affected by these two pathways is the finding that effects of illusions have been reported to vanish under isoluminance -where critically, isolumance processing is thought to be mediated by the parvocellular pathways only (Hubel & Livingstone, 1987) . However, more recent studies have questioned this distinction and reported visual illusions to be equally affected under conditions of isoluminance and luminance contrast, suggesting that parvocellular pathways are also critically involved in the perception of illusions (e.g., Hamburger, Hansen, & Gegenfurtner, 2007) . The independence of the magnocellular and parvocellular pathways is also questionable, making clear predictions about the functionality of these pathways debatable (see also, Nieuwenhuis, Jepma, Fors, & Olivers, 2008; Snowden, 2002) . In addition, it is unclear how the time-course of processing in the magno and cellular pathways relate to the time-course of responses in the present study. The reported differences in timing between the magnocellular and parvocellular pathways is around 20 ms in macaque monkey (Nowak, Munk, Girard, & Bullier, 1995) . Though this number may be not be entirely accurate for human observers, comparison of this small number to the time-course of performance in the present study that ranged from 150 ms to 350 ms is not straightforward and requires further investigation.
Our findings clearly show that perception and saccade execution show a similar increase in accuracy over time. We interpret this as evidence that they both rely on a shared representation that provides increasingly accurate information for the required task. We are not suggesting that this representation exists in a single brain area or is the result of a single visual processing streamrather, we believe that there are multiple brain areas and visual processes involved in processing the target object from the moment it appears. These results do, however, challenge the notion that there are aspects of the total information available about the objects that are inaccessible to either consciousness or the systems that guide action.
